General William Tecumseh Sherman praised General
George Crook as the greatest Indian fighter the Army of the United States
had ever had. Crook's biographer, Lieutenant John Gregory Bourke,
immortalized him by describing the border campaigns in which Crook brought
the Apaches to terms. According to Bourke, this was a feat that even 4,000
Royal Dragoons of the King of Spain had failed to accomplish. With limited
manpower and consummate skill Crook achieved a pacification that had eluded
both Spaniard and Mexican. Although Bourke knew something of the military
history of the Southwest, his purpose was not to write a regional summary,
but to record a life. The story of the Spanish soldier on the frontier has
yet to be written.
In reality Crook's Apache enemy was but a
sharply honed remnant of a vast array of Indian nations that had fought
through centuries for simple survival. The Blue Dragoons in the cavalry of
the Army of the United States were elaborately equipped and lavishly
supplied when compared to the ragged, impoverished frontier militia of New
Spain. The saga of the Spanish dragoons bears recounting because it is
replete with courage, frustration, bravery, ingenuity, cruelty, mercy,
treachery, loyalty, patriotism and perseverance. It is the story of
invasion, conquest, insurgence, victory and defeat. It is the clash of Stone
Age and Iron Age.
Nearly three centuries before Crook's
campaigns, the Spaniards had penetrated north of the Apacheria; Juan de
Onate led his colonizing expedition across the Rio Grande del Norte early in
May, 1598. It would be four score years before the Pueblo nations of the New
Mexico Territory would expel the Spaniards and rally the nomadic tribes to continual harrassment and warfare against Spanish settlements and Christian Indian
rancherias. Military operations along the fronteras de la Provincia de
Sonora grew out of the need to protect valuable silver shipments from Nacosari and San Juan Bautista. Spanish farms in mountain highlands and
desert river valleys were ruinously exposed to frequent raids by Indians
from all directions. Only the presence of royal troops could secure the
roads and guarantee some measure of peace to the outposts of empire. A line
of presidios stretching from Durango to Parral seemed like the answer in the
1670's.
Military strategists may have a definition
for a frontier, but the Spanish politicians and academicians had no idea of
the vastness of the region they protected only nominally. Although the
borders of Nueva Vizcaya touched the southern limits of Nueva Mexico, the
whole region was genuinely a frontier. Spanish mines dotted the Sierra Madre
Occidental from Durango to Parral; the intervening land was a mixture of
missions, cattle ranching, and desolation. In no way was there a settled
pattern to life or land use. The Spaniard was indeed an invader, an
interloper, an exploiter with a strange and distasteful culture. The Indian
peoples who lived frugally from the land were forced to extract minerals
from the earth while the Spaniard lived gracefully in his new home. The
Indian was uncertain about the reason he had to forego his former life, of
hunting and faming to dig the earth for the Spaniard. Soon the thin life
lines of transport through the frontier were open to attack and the King was
warned to protect the Royal Roads lest he lose his fifth of silver and the
colonists, their lives. And so it was done. From Mexico City to the silver
cities of Potosi and Zacatecas soldiers were stationed to guard the carts.
When silver was discovered in Guadiana
(Durango) and later at Santa Barbara and Parral, the northern frontier then
encompassed nearly one-third of all New Spain. Despite Lt. Bourke's remark
about the King of Spain sending 4,000 dragoons against the Apache, there
were never so many men massed to protect the frontier. In the 1670's Nueva
Vizcaya boasted all of 75 soldiers. To the West along the coastal plain the
major instruments of pacification were the Jesuit missions. Until the
arrival of the militaristic Bourbon strategists in the mid-eighteenth
century, the lone presidio of the Province of Sinaloa protected the entire
coastal flank of New Spain--unreal, but true.
Because wars are not fought by rabbits, the
early decades of the seventeenth century were peaceful along the despoblado
of the central plateau. Sporadic military encounters were limited to a few
squads of soldiers and militia. The real military operations were undertaken
in mountain fastnesses among the Tepehuan and Tarahumara who resisted miners
and missionaries alike. The first true test of Spanish power in the vastness
of the northern frontiers came in November, 1616, when the Tepehuan rose up
in obedience to their hechicero leaders. Depending on the private
revelations of the medicine-men, the Tepehuan expected a permanent expulsion
of the Spanish intruders. Before the Spaniards could flee or defend
themselves ten missionaries and 200 civilians were killed. The rebellion
raged for two years until Spanish re-enforcements pressed from all
directions, bringing the Indians to submission. Both Indian and Spaniard
learned lessons. The Indian knew he could win against the horse-soldiers;
the Spaniard knew he needed stronger garrisons.
The western flank of Sinaloa had been
expanded and protected by the remarkably successful Captain Diego Martinez
de Hurdiade. His courage and prowess opened the lands of southern Sonora to
missionary expansion. His successors brought the King's arms into unknown
regions and in 1634 Captain Pedro de Perea laid claim to a new province to
be called Nueva Andalusia; he wanted to be the new Adelantado of Sonora, but
death took him in 1645 after he enticed several families to colonize the
Sonoran frontier from Parral. These new, scattered families lived among
relatively peaceful Indians --the Nebomes, Jovas, Opatas, and Pimas Altos.
But their position was both temporary and precarious because they lived far
beyond the range of Spanish military assistance. The whole frontier, in
fact, was changing and Spanish settlements were scattered over thousands of
square miles without prospect of outside protection.
The problems began in 1671. The long drought
of the 70's had set in. Some Seris and Guaymas Indians under Chief Siona
wandered into the Nebome mission of Padre Cornelius Gillert. They demanded
food, but the missionary ordered his own Indians to arms against the
ungrateful heathens. The several Seris were killed and a small war was at
hand. Gillert appealed to the Alcalde Mayor of San Juan Bautista for help.
Unfortunately Pedro Alvarez Castrillon had gone and the successor to his
office, Diego Lopez del Dicastillo, refused assistance because he claimed
the mission was beyond his jurisdiction. Consequently Gillert sought help
from the Presidio of Sinaloa which was under the command of Captain Antonio
de Otermin, soon to become the tragic governor of Nueva Mexico. On June 17,
Captain Andre's de Buelna with 15 presidial soldiers and several militia
opened an albazo on the Seris whom they found near the missions. The early
dawn attack succeeded in killing 60 and taking 20 prisoners. A second attack
was launched in which 40 more were killed and 23 taken prisoner; but Buelna
and four companions were cut down in the fighting.
This encounter was not significant for being
unique because now and then presidio forces held skirmishes with marauding
Indians. The fact that the missionaries had to appeal to Sinaloa for
protection instead of San Juan Bautista indicated the confused state of
affairs. All across the frontier Indians were on the move against Spanish
settlements because the drought was forcing them to find food and sustenance
beyond their traditional homes. Even the Camino Real down which the
treasures of Parral went to Durango and Mexico City was experiencing an
occasional raid. The frontier was revealing itself as a sieve for security.
The weakest flower on the budding frontier
was toppled on August 10, 1680, when the Pueblo Indians successfully
attacked Santa Fe, Nueva Mexico. Although Southwestern historians have dealt
with the Pueblo Revolt as a major episode in Mexican history, there is
reason to consider it only as a part of a wider series of rebellions. For
some it has been labeled as the Great Southwestern Revolt, but there have
been many other rebellions in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries that
would call this description into question. What the revolt did accomplish
was to alert the Viceroyalty and the Spanish King to the pitifully weak
position they held in New Spain.
The revolt in Nueva Mexico jostled Nueva
Vizcaya into action. The Sargente Mayor of Sonora, Juan Bautista de Escorza,
received word of the revolt on September 15. He organized his force of ten
soldiers who were on detached duty from the Presidio of Sinaloa and marched
to Senecu in seven days. The Alcalde Mayor of the Sinaloa garrison, Admiral
Don Isirdo Atondo y Antillon refused to move from Nio where he was building
boats for his California expedition. Spain's response was pathetic.
Hundreds were killed and dispossessed, but only tiny squads could be
mustered for defense.
In Sonora the fear of open rebellion was
rampant. Indians were held in great suspicion. On July 2, 1681, an
hispanisized Indian named Xavier reported to the Alcalde Mayor Lazaro
Verdugo that Indians were gathering at Chinapa just south of the Bacanuche
Valley. The Pimas Altos and Opatas were plotting to join with the Apache to
overthrow the Spaniards as the Pueblo had done. Verdugo lost no time. He
ordered the ringleaders at Chinapa and Bacoachi to be seized. He dispatched
Captain Pedro de Peralta from Nacosari with ten men to arrest the governor,
alcaldes and topile of Cuquiarachi. Leaving San Juan Bautista himself at
eight o'clock in the evening, he made a forced march to Chinapa where the
ringleaders were taken from their jacals at four the next morning. Peralta
failed in his mission because the Indians eluded capture. Finally on July 14
Verdugo sent Juan Bautista de Escorza with 18 men to capture the fugitives.
The Indians were finally caught at Bacadeguachi and two were killed. While
Escorza chased these rebels, Verdugo vigorously moved against Baserac,
Guachinera and Teuricachi. On July 28 Verdugo and Escorza joined forces;
they were met on the trail by-Francisco Xavier Cuervo de Valdez who was
being sent to Sonora as the new Alcalde Mayor. Cuervo acquiesced with
Verdugo's campaign and on August 6, 1681, several leaders were executed
despite the pleas of the missionaries. All the weapons at Bacadeguachi were
burned and the Alcalde Mayor prohibited the use of the bow and arrow for one
year.
These events appear routine in one sense. But
they reveal the intense reaction of the Spaniards in a manifestly panicky
situation. The forces of the northern frontier were simply inadequate for
protection. For the next three years the Spaniards of Sonora lived in mortal
fear of the extensive Pima nation to the northwest. Rumors were constant
about new alliances and possible raids.
Then it happened; not exactly what the
Sonorans anticipated, but it was the beginning of constant warfare. The
quiet, isolated Franciscan mission of Nuestra Senora de Soledad near
Carretas was attacked by Sumas and Janos. Fray Manuel Beltran, OFM, and
Captain Antonio de Albizu together with a mestizo servant were killed. Six
women and two or three boys were taken prisoner. The raid occurred in the
dark morning hours of May 6, 1684.
News of the attack traveled slowly because
Captain Francisco Ramirez de Salazar, the Alcalde Mayor of Casas Grandes,
did not hear of it until May 11. In the meanwhile the Sumas and Janos
attacked Carretas May 9 and Fray Antonio de Aguilar fled to the Jesuit
mission at Baserac seeking help from Father Juan Antonio Estrella. Word of
the destruction was sent on to Francisco Cuervo at San Juan on May 13. Panic
seized the Sonoran frontier. Cuervo issued the call to arms throughout
the Province.
In two days thirty-six men.answered the call
at San Juan Bautista. On May 16 twelve more were mustered in at Teuricachi;
the same day forty-two responded at Nacosari. On the next day nineteen
joined the forces from Tepachi. And before the week was out eleven from
Nacatobari, sixty-two from Bacanuchi, and thirty-six from San Miguel
answered muster.
Cuervo assessed his frontier army. He had 218
men under arms. They were all carrying arquebuses with a variety of pistols,
sabres, short-swords, breast-plates, shields, and even a few suits of armor.
Twelve of the men had fully armored horses. The Lieutenant of San Juan
Bautista, Pasqual Volado, prohibited the use of the escopeta, fearing that
more friends than enemies would be killed if discharged.
Captain Juan Fernandez de la Fuente was
ordered to Carretas with nineteen men who left Nacosari on foot May 17.
Three days later they had only reached Guachiera and Fernandez appealed to
Cuervo for horses and two or three suits of armor. Cuervo responded by
assigning him fifty mounts from the herd of Salvador Moreno. For good
measure he dispatched fifty Opata auxiliaries from surrounding pueblos.
While the Spaniards geared for war, Opata scouts reconnoitered the burned
hulk of Carretas. No enemy were in sight. When Fernandez arrived with his
well armed complement, the town was still smouldering. Bodies of the victims
strewn about town were buried. Fernandez de la Fuente gathered up rags and
tatters from the victims and made a banner that would be carried in the
campaign in memory of the slaughter at Carretas. The force of Fuente was
awesome and cumbersome. He rode at the head of twenty-seven armed and
armored men. Each carried an arquebus, shield, short-barreled fire arms, and
a sword or scimitar. The records hasten to justify the use of the scimitar
that was considered an immoral weapon unless used in avenging a particular
brutality. With Fuente came seventy-six Opata warriors.
It was June 3 when the combined forces from
Casas Grandes and the Province of Sonora rendezvoused at the Place of the
Conversion about two leagues from Soledad. News had come that the enemy were
settled in the Penol del Diablo. Under the command of maestro del campo
Alonso Garcia with 12 men and 28 Sonoran militia under Fuente, the Spaniards
attacked some 2,000 Sumas, Janos, and Apaches. The battle lasted six hours.
The Spaniards finally retreated in two groups, having lost one Spaniard and
nine Indian auxiliaries. The horses were badly wounded. On June 10 Fuente
met Cuervo at Oputo where they decided to release
the Indian auxiliaries so they could return home to plant the summer crops.
Fuente and Cuervo then visited several Indian towns to give alms to the
widows of the men who had fallen in the fighting.
The result of the 1684 encounter was
significant because it precipitated the Spaniards on the frontier to seek
military aid from the Viceroy. The Alcalde Mayor of San Juan ordered a daily
patrol of six armed men to guard the area of Bavispe because the Jocomes
knew well how to penetrate this area. The twelve-man contingent was under
the command of Juan Vaca. The Jesuit missionaries under the leadership of
Padre Antonio Leal were preparing for the possible abandonment of the
missions. Finally Alcalde Mayor Cuervo convened a general junta for the
defense of the province at San Juan Bautista on June 29. The immediate
strategy was to protect Sonora's open flank by increasing the Guachinera
Patrol to twenty-two men. Already the Suma had cut the road to Parral and
Conchos were arriving daily in the Sonoran towns seeking refuge--but in
reality they were infiltrating for a general attack.
At this time the attitudes of Indian fighting
on the part of different Spanish soldiers comes to light. Cuervo was set on
a serious, offensive campaign. He was supported by Juan Fernandez de la
Fuente who always harbored great schemes for a combined.army. Fuente urged
the conscription of large numbers to form a buen cuerpo militar. He was
willing to take vecinos [residents], mulatos, negros, mestizos [mixed Indian
and Spanish races], and every sort of person who was normally proscribed
from carrying arms. As a reward for their participation in the campaign he
wanted to grant these people the perpetual right to carry arms. Down at the
Real of San Miguel the Spaniards raised up a company of 200 Yaquis, well
paid, equipped and treated.
By August all was in readiness for a major
campaign. Cuervo gave the battle cry at San Juan Bautista and by August
15th, four companies of men were ready to ride under the commands of Perdo
Garcioa Almazin, Francisco Pacheco, Andres Rezabel, and Cristobal de Leon.
In six days they joined forces with Captain Francisco Ramirez de Salazar at
Alamo Hueco. But there was no enemy to be found! From the area of the Penol
del Diablo the combined forces moved downriver toward Janos and beyond;
Cuervo's column rode down one bank, Salazar's on the other. They rode for
nine days. On August 30 the force was only 15 leagues from El Paso del Norte
and Cuervo had to return to relinquish his position as Alcalde Mayor. It was
futile.
The Sonoran frontier was having its problems,
but the general military situation throughout Nueva Vizcaya was more than
precarious. Governor Joseph Niera y Quiroga wrote the Viceroy, Conde de
Paredes that he needed at least 4,000 pesos to wage a defensive war to
protect the province. He had only thirty men to cover the main routes of
Indian rebels at Parral and Cuencame. His soldiers were earning only 450
pesos annually and they had to pay for Indian scouts, spies, and field
campaigns. Although the government might talk of presidio protection, the
garrison of Santa Catarina at Papsquiaro had dwindled to nine soldiers and
one Captain; San Hipolito only eight and a Captain. The other presidios were
not under his control and they had the most men and money. Sinaloa in 1684
had 43 soldiers and one cavo; San Sebastian, 6 soldiers and one captain; and
Cerrogordo, twenty-three soldiers and I captain. Niera wanted to know how
anyone expected 15 them to maintain peace and protect transport of silver
and supplies?
Only the year before a wagon train had been
attacked on the cart road between Gallo and Cerrogordo. Nine of eighteen
carts were taken, 300 mules were driven off and four persons left dead.
Another beleaguered train was attacked outside Parral in which 250 livestock
were run off and several persons wounded. Just after Governor Niera reached
Parral in 1684, the pack train that was bringing supplies to the military
store of Captain Juan Fernandez de Retana was decimated. Niera ordered all
the vecinos of Parral to arms within fifteen days. They were equipped with
arquebuses, powder, balls and pack horses. This was done under penalty of
100 pesos.
While Niera pondered his problems at Parral,
news of the Sonoran troubles reached the mountain capital. So the Governor
addressed the King on July 15. New presidios were absolutely essential. It
took only a short while for the King to respond because a royal cedula of
June 16, 1685, ordered the establishment of two presidios at Cuencame and
Gallo; these key places along the cart road to Durango each received fifty
soldiers (plazas) and a Captain. The town of Casas Grandes, was ordered to
have a garrison of twenty-five men on December 22, 1685. This garrison was
to aid in securing the road to Sonora. Apparently the Casas Grandes presidio
was an action of the Viceroy and Governor because Royal approval for the
twenty-five men was not received until February 7, 1686.
The situation on the frontier did not change
much in the decade of the 1680's. In August 1687, Juan Isido de Pardinvas
Villar de Franco assumed the governorship of Nueva Vizcaya from Niera. He
reported to the King that he was pleased with the territory because of its
minerals and agricultural potential. But the province was slowly being
depopulated due to marauding Indians. In fact, he admitted to the king that
since his arrival at Parral he had never laid his guns down. Pardinas had
his own ideas about Spanish soldiery because he did not see the need to
amass large forces. A Spanish soldier properly equipped could cope with the
enemy. He had seen ten to twelve soldiers holding off 1,000 Indians! While
this may appear as a statement of Spanish bravado, it was often true that
they fought against overwhelming odds. The fault of the Spaniard was less
his exaggeration than his miscalculation that stalemate is victory.
Pardinas was hardly in office when a general
uprising was threatened in the Pimeria Alta. The officer in charge of the
Sinaloa detachment in Sonora descended on the village of Mototicachi, near
Arispe, and massacred fifty Pimas and took all the women and children away
as prisoners. This savage act incensed both the Spaniards and the Pimas.
Nicolas de Higuerra, the responsible officer, was sentenced to death, but
fled before the punishment could be inflicted. Knowing the Indian penchant
for vengeance, the Spanish towns prepared for action. It was the season for
combat anyhow, so the Alcalde Mayor of Sonora armed seventy vecinos and
called on Captain Juan Ferndndez de la Fuente to come from his post at Janos.
Together the forces engaged the Janos, Jocomes, and Sumas who were
attempting to take advantage of the Pima rebellion. The Governor explained
to the Viceroy that much more help was needed, but all the garrisons were so
far apart that units had to be called in over distances of 150 and more
leagues (350 miles). What was needed, quite obviously, was another presidio
in the immediate vicinity.
A year later Don Lope de Sierra Osorio wrote
an informe to the Viceroy lamenting the decline in security all across the
frontier. The hills were wide open and the Indians were total masters of the
terrain. They knew that all they had to do was cut the line of supply and
the Spanish colonies would be ruined. Sierra Osorio reminded the Viceroy
that Parral's population had declined to a mere 100 and that no town between
there and Durango could boast of more than 50 people, while most only had 20
or 30 people at most. When Pardinas became Governor, 17 reales in the
province were deserted and countless haciendas and rancherias had been
abandoned because of frequent Indian raids. It was a trend that had to be
reversed or one day the rebels would reach Mexico City.
The clamor and concern on the frontier began
to take effect. The Alcalde Mayor of San Juan, Blas del Castillo, informed
his superiors that the vecinos would no longer volunteer to protect the
area. They had become full-time soldiers without pay. The patrols had become
ineffective and irregular. Unless 30 men well armed and supplied and in the
King's pay were made available there was simply no hope for the province. If
the King did not concede a presidio, the province would be lost like New
Mexico. Pardinas agreed with Castillo when he wrote the Viceroy from
Cariochic during the early days of the Tarahumara uprising. To him it seemed
that every rock produced an enemy. Finally, on October 23, 1690, the
Viceroy, Conde de Galve, conceded a presidio in response to Pardinas',
informe of May 31. It was to be erected in the most suitable place.
Everyone was ecstatic. At last the dragoons
of Spain would come to maintain peace on the frontier. Pardinas called for
opinions from all the experienced Indian fighters and leaders in the north.
Fernandez de la Fuente recommended Guachinera; it was close to his garrison
at Janos. Don Luis de Valdez opted for Cuchuta which was closer to his
haciendas. Blas del Castillo and several vecinos of the Sonora Valley
chose Bacanuche -after all that was closer to their interests. The only
truly disinterested opinion came from Captain Francisco del Castillo Betancur who recommended the Valley of Caballona which was strategically
placed to block invasion routes and respond to any contingency. Strangely
enough, Betancur's recommendation went unheeded, but fifteen years later
when the presidio was finally located, it was not far away because it was
built at Corodeguachi.
The parecer [view] of Captain Francisco
Ramfrez de Salazar was really the most effective one. He wrote the Viceroy
recommending that the new presidio have no place. It should be, in Ramirez's
mind, a "flying company" that was continually on the move. The concept of a
static garrison on the frontier was erroneous because the soldiers had to
respond to attacks almost everywhere at once. Nor was Ramirez alone in this
growing opinion. Others felt it would be foolish to build a new presidio at
great cost only to have to assign a third of the complement to the fort to
protect the buildings and herds. Everyone was in agreement that a roving
troop would accomplish most. Even Fuente was in complete accord; he could
see the possibility of his being able to call on these soldiers to increase
his command. With the reconquest of the New Mexico Territory now in the preparatory stages
under Diego de Vargas, Fuente was pushing his preference to unify all
commands and wage a massive war of fuego y sangre [fire and blood] on all
the Suma, Janos, Jocomes, and Apaches.
On July 18, 1691, the Viceroy Conde de Galve
established by decree the Compania Volante for the fronteras de Sonora. He
granted salaries for thirty men and a captain. And he named Francisco
Ramirez de Salazar captain of that presidio to serve with the same pay as
any other captain, 600 pesos annually. In the same letter he scored Fuente
for his overbearing insistence on the unification of forces and his lack of
cooperation in protecting other parts of the frontier. The Viceroy
recommended that Fuentes tend to his job -at which Fuente happened to be one
of the best.
Ramirez was one of the greatest of all
frontier soldiers New Spain had known. In 1690 he had already completed
fifty-eight years in the King's service. When the Pimeria Alta was tottering
on the brink of rebellion, he was quick to rove the frontier in a show of
Spanish might and remain a step ahead of any possible attack. When Governor
Pardinas received notice of the formation of the Flying Company, he rode
after Ramirez de Salazar, joining him in a search for Apache enclaves. They
were north of Teuricachi and had found no trace of the enemy. Luckily the
Captain of the Sinaloa squadron arrived with his contingent, several Indian
allies, and thirty loads of supplies. At a junta de guerra they all agreed
that a deeper reconnaissance was in order and the Spanish dragoons rode deep
into Apache country until they reached the Gila. An Apache prisoner told
them the river flowed west into the land of the Sobaipuri. If it had not
been for a driving snowstorm and the biting cold, the expedition would have
moved on to take the offensive against the Apache. But as it was, Pardinas,
Ramirez and the Sinaloan Captain returned to their base some 100 leagues
south.
In March, 1692, Captain Ramirez de Salazar
continued his Piman reconnaissance. He visited the walled town of Quiburi
and determined that the Sobapuris were truly at peace. Returning via the
Pimeria Alta, he visited several Jesuit missions and discussed the new
situation with Padre Eusebio Francisco Kino at Dolores. All seemed well in
hand as he returned to Parral and left for Mexico City to firm up the
details on the new Flying Company for Sonora with the Viceroy himself.
In Mexico City it became obvious that the
Flying Company was not a simple gesture of increased military support. It
had become a military compromise. During the past decade the flurry of
letters deluging the military commander of New Spain had created such
confusion that no one seemed to know whether to expand or contract any or
all presidios. The Viceroy had decided to cut down the number of men in the
more interior garrisons and assign them to the new Flying Company of the
frontier. This would solve many problems of finance. Gallant, hardy Ramirez
was to ride back through Nueva Vizcaya and enlist his men from the presidios
who were losing a certain specified number of men. Apaches couldn't bring
him down, but bureaucracy did, for Captain Francisco Ramirez de Salazar only
reached Zacatecas on the return journey when he died, leaving the Flying
Company without place or pilot.
When news reached Mexico City of Ramirez's
timely but unexpected death, the Viceroy took immediate advantage of the
King's recent cedula praising Don Domingo Jironza Petris de Cruzate. He was
named commander of the Flying Company on the spot. The Viceroy was off the
hook and Jironza was back on the frontier to fight the same enemy on a new
flank. Fuente scoffed at the prospects of the Flying Company. It was a
paper army because it merely transferred title to a few men already on the
frontier. The detachment from Sinaloa was to be increased to 20 men and 5
each were to be taken from Cuencame and Gallo where the Viceroy felt there
was less need for the fifty men assigned. This actually increased the
fighting force on the frontier by only five or ten men. Cruzat later
complained to the Viceroy that he needed at least fifty men, if not seventy.
And so the issue see-sawed between Sonora and Mexico City.
The decade of the 1690's was occupied by the
Tarahumara rebellion. Units from all the presidios were engaged for long
years in bringing the rebellious Indians to peace. All the great Indian
fighters at one time or another were sent into the deep canyons and high
mountains. Fuente, Rezabel Cruzate, and Retana each had his day in the
hills. The major contention was whether to wage an offensive or defensive
war. Captain Juan Fernandez Retana on detached assignment from San Francisco
de los Conchos followed the orders of Governor Gabriel del Castillo in
Parral and punished several rebellious ringleaders by executing them.
Retana's action merely angered the rebellious tribes all the more, and
Retana himself was accused of excessive cruelty. He was stripped of his
command by the King and ordered out of the frontier in 1702. But the
Viceroy intervened and laid the blame on the recently deceased Governor
Castillo so the cedula was suspended. Retana was formally exonerated in 1704
by King Philip V.
At the beginning of the Tarahumara rebellion
the Captain and Governor of the Presidio of Sinaloa, Manuel Agrament y Arce
died in office. The Viceroy, the Conde del Galve, at the unanimous
insistence of the frontier community appointed Captain Andres de Rezabel in
his place. Rezabel was an unattached bachelor without lands or mines; he was
the wholly dedicated Indian fighter. But no sooner did Rezabel take office
than the Audiencia of Guadalajara intervened because one Don Jacinto de
Fuensaldana paid 4,000 pesos for the privilege of being named to that
command! While Rezaebel fought in the mountains, Fuensaldana fought in the
courts for his post. Rezabel won out because he proved himself the
indispensable leader needed. Fuensaldana was given command of Sonora's
Flying Company. And in the fine tradition of the Sonoran military, Don
Jacinto immediately put the men of his command into his own personal
service.
He took command in 1701, just at the time Jironza had ordered some
of the Flying Company to accompany Padre Kino and Salvatierra on a
California expedition. By 1704 strong complaints were being registered in
Mexico City that Fuensaldana never mounted one campaign against the Apache,
Suma, Jocomes or anyone else. Whether the accusation was true or not is
immaterial; Fuente was holding the frontier from his position at Janos and
he received some help from Fuensaldana's contingent. After Fuensaldana was
removed as Captain of the frontier guard, his nephew Captain Gregory Alvarez
Tunon y Quiroz assumed command. This lad had plenty of frontier experience
going back to the days when his uncle rode with Don Domingo Teran de los
Rios who dominated the garrison at the Real de Guadalupe and Los Frailes.
Tera'n learned early how to employ soldiers in private interests; so too did
Tunon y Quiroz. Now the young Alvarez followed in their footsteps and
resurrected the comment from the vecinos that they would just as soon suffer
at the hands of the Apachos.
This embroiled, inefficient, and intolerable
situation appeared just that way to the officials in Mexico. The expense was
staggering and the results were non-existent. A thorough reform was in
order, not only in Sonora but throughout all the frontier provinces.
The situation has reached such proportions by
1722 that when the new Viceroy the Marques de Casafuerte arrived, the
outgoing Viceroy lamented corruption throughout the presidial system.
Consequently Casafuerte recommended a reform to the King which he ordered on
February 19, 1724. The Viceroy named Pedro de Rivera as field marshal and
visitor to the presidios of New Spain. In 1723 the system, without affect,
had cost 444,883 pesos plus the costs of the paz y guerra funds that paid
Indian allies and scouts. Salaries were too high; costs were too high;
inflation was compounded by the 18 percent discount rate in favor of the
Captains of the pre'tidios who controlled all sales In the Company stores.
Pedro de Rivera regularized all the
presidios, the salaries, the merchandise prices, the rules, in short,
everything. His Reglamento was made effective July 1, 1729. Captain's
salaries were set at 600 pesos, soldiers earned 350, and junior officers
were given an extra 40 to 60 pesos for their positions of responsibility. An
attempt was made to regularize equipment, powder allotments, and the number
of horses for each man. Rivera saw the value of using the lance which was
cheaper than guns and forced the soldier to be effective against the enemy
by contact. Most of the presidios did not have and did not use the lance
which was a favorite weapon in the battle-line wars of Europe. Some of the
provincial governors objected bitterly to Rivera's introduction of the lance
because It meant for them that much time would have to be spent in close
order drill and tactics would have to be worked out to utilize the weapon in
Indian warfare. Since the soldiers were being limited to six pounds of
powder per year, however, there was reason to accept some of Rivera's
demands.
Like all things Spanish, Rivera's reforms
took time. He was three years on the trail of inspection and it took two
more years before the reglamento and projecto were written and implemented.
His inspection did settle one thing. The Flying Company of Sonora was to
land. Its base of operations these many years had been in and around Santa
Rosa de Carodeguachi, so the presidio which had been known so long as Santa
Rosa de Corodeguachi Fronteras de Sonora just became, simply, Fronteras. The
Rivera inspection also revealed the moral gap created by the demise of the
Sobapuris perimeter at Quiburi and along the San Pedro. So motions were
begun to establish another garrison west of Fronteras. This later became the
presidio of Terrenate, which is the counterpart of Fort Huachuca on the
other side of the mountain.